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Abstract
Developing a differentially private deep learning algorithm is challenging, due to
the difficulty in analyzing the sensitivity of objective functions that are typically
used to train deep neural networks. Many existing methods resort to the stochastic
gradient descent algorithm and apply a pre-defined sensitivity to the gradients
for privatizing weights. However, their slow convergence typically yields a high
cumulative privacy loss. Here, we take a different route by employing the method
of auxiliary coordinates, which allows us to independently update the weights
per layer by optimizing a per-layer objective function. This objective function
can be well approximated by a low-order Taylor’s expansion, in which sensitivity
analysis becomes tractable. We perturb the coefficients of the expansion for privacy,
which we optimize using more advanced optimization routines than SGD for faster
convergence. We empirically show that our algorithm provides a decent trained
model quality under a modest privacy budget.1
1 Introduction
While providing outstanding performance, it has been shown that trained deep neural networks
(DNNs) can expose sensitive information from the dataset they were trained on [2, 14, 13, 5]. In
order to protect potentially sensitive training data, many existing methods adopt the notion of privacy,
called differential privacy (DP) [4]. Differentially private algorithms often comprise a noise injection
step (e.g. during the training process), which is generally detrimental to performance and leads to a
trade-off between privacy and utility. The amount of noise necessary for a desired level of privacy
depends on the sensitivity of an algorithm, a maximum difference in its output depending on whether
or not a single individual participates in the data. In DNNs, the sensitivity of an objective function
is often intractable to quantify, since data appears in the function in a nested and complex way. In
addition, such models have thousands to millions of parameters, one needs to saveguard, and require
many passes over the dataset in training. As a result, providing meaningful privacy guarantees while
maintaining reasonable performance remains a challenging task for DNNs.
One existing approach to this problem, DP-SGD [1, 7, 6], avoids complicated sensitivities, by
applying a pre-defined sensitivity to the gradients, which are then perturbed with Gaussian noise
before updating the weights to ensure DP. This work also introduces the moments accountant (MA)
[1], a useful method for computing cumulative privacy loss when training for many epochs (a formal
introduction to this method is found in Appendix A). In another line of recent work [15, 11, 10], DP
training is achieved by approximating the nested objective function through Taylor approximation
and perturbing each of the coefficients of the approximated loss before training.
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made, see Appendix.
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In this paper, we combine the benefits of these two approaches. We modify the algorithm called
the method of auxiliary coordinates (MAC), which allows independent weight updates per layer, by
framing the interaction between layers as a local communication problem via introducing auxiliary
coordinates [3]. This allows us to split the nested objective function into per-layer objective functions,
which can be approximated by low-order Taylor’s expansions. In this case the sensitivity analysis of
the coefficients becomes tractable.
2 DP-MAC
2.1 The Method of Auxiliary Coordinates
Here we provide a short introduction on the MAC algorithm (see [3] for details). Under a fully
connected neural net with K hidden layers, a typical mean squared error (MSE) objective is given by
E(W) = 1
2N
N∑
n=1
||yn − f(xn;W)||2, (1)
where f(xn;W) = fK+1(. . . f2(f1(xn;W1) . . .);WK+1). We denote W as a collection of weight matrices
of (K + 1)-layers, i.e., W = {Wk}K+1k=1 , where the size of each weight matrix is given by Wk ∈ RD
k
in×Dkout .
Each layer activation function is given by fk(xn;Wk) = fk(Wk>xn), and fk could be any type of element-
wise activation functions. In the MAC framework [3], the objective function in eq. 1 is expanded by adding
auxiliary variables {zn} (one per datapoint) such that the optimization over many variables are decoupled:
E(W,Z;µ) = Eo(W,Z) +
K∑
k=1
Ek(W,Z, µ), (2)
where the partial objective functions at the output layer and at the k-th layer are given
by Eo(WK+1,ZK) = 12N
∑N
n=1 ||yn − fK+1(zK,n;WK+1)||2, and Ek(Wk,Zk,Zk−1, µ) =
µ
2N
∑N
n=1 ||zk,n − fk(zk−1,n;Wk)||2. Alternating optimization of this objective function w.r.t. W and Z
minimizes the objective function. In this paper, we set µ = 1, as suggested in [3]. For obtaining differentially
private estimates of W, it turns out we need to privatize the W update steps only, while we can keep the Z
update steps non-private, as has been studied in Expectation Maximization (EM) type algorithms before [8, 9].
To make this process DP, we first approximate each objective function as 1st or 2nd-order polynomials in
the weights. Then, we perturb each approximate objective function by adding noise to the coefficients and
optimize it for estimating W. How much noise we need to add to these coefficients depends on the sensitivity of
these coefficients as well as the privacy loss we allow in each training step. The final estimate WT depends
on estimates Wt and Zt for all t < T and so we keep the privacy loss per iteration fixed and compute the
cumulative loss using the moments accountant.
2.2 DP-approximate to the per-layer objective function
First, we consider approximating the per-layer objective function via the 2nd-order Taylor expansion
Ek(Wk) =
1
2N
N∑
n=1
||zk,n − fk(zk−1,n;Wk)||2 ≈ 12N
ak + Dkout∑
h=1
wkh
>bkh +
Dkout∑
h=1
wkh
>Ckhwkh
 ,
where wkh ∈ RDkin is the h-th column of the matrix Wk, and the derivation of each term ak,bkh ∈
RD
k
in ,Ckh ∈ RDkin×Dkin is given below. Here we choose to use the softplus function as an example activation
function for f , but any twice differentiable function is valid. We introduce a new notation Tn(wkh)
Ek(Wk) =
1
2N
N∑
n=1
Dkout∑
h=1
Tn(wkh) (3)
where Tn(wkh) = z2kh,n − 2zkh,nf(wkh>zk−1,n) + {f(wkh>zk−1,n)}2. We then approximate Tn(wkh)
by the 2nd-order Taylor expansion evaluated at wˆkh. In the first optimization step, we approximate the loss
function by the 2nd-order Taylor expansion evaluated at a randomly drawn wˆkh ∼ N (0, I). In the consecutive
optimization step, we evaluate the loss function at the noised-up estimate wˆkh obtained from the previous
optimization step.
Tn(wkh) ≈ Tn(wˆkh) + (wkh − wˆkh)>∂Tnkh + 12 (wkh − wˆkh)>∂2Tnkh(wkh − wˆkh), (4)
2
where the derivative expressions of Tn(wkh) are given by
∂Tnkh =[−2zkh,nf ′(wˆkh>zk−1,n) + 2f(wˆkh>zk−1,n)f ′(wˆkh>zk−1,n)]zk−1,n,
∂2Tnkh =[−2zkh,nf ′′(wˆkh>zk−1,n) + 2f(wˆkh>zk−1,n)f ′′(wˆkh>zk−1,n) + 2{f ′(wˆkh>zk−1,n)}2]zk−1,nzk−1,n>.
From this, we define the coefficients ak,bkh,Ckh as: ak =
∑N
n=1
∑Dkout
h=1 [Tn(wˆkh) − wˆkh>∂Tnkh +
1
2
wˆkh
>∂2Tnkhwˆkh],bkh =
∑N
n=1
[
∂Tnkh − ∂2Tnkhwˆkh
]
, Ckh =
∑N
n=1
1
2
∂2Tnkh.
Adding Gaussian noise to these coefficients for privacy modifies the objective function by
E˜k(wk) ≈ 12N
a˜k + Dkout∑
h=1
wkh
>b˜kh +
Dkout∑
h=1
wkh
>C˜khwkh
 , (5)
where a˜k = ak +N (0, (∆ak)2σ2), b˜k = bk +N (0, (∆bk)2σ2I), C˜k = Ck +N (0, (∆Ck)2σ2I) and the
amount of additive Gaussian noise depends on the sensitivity (∆ak,∆bk,∆Ck) of each term. When using a
purely gradient-based optimization routine (e.g. Adam, unlike Conjugate Gradient), we don’t have to perturb ak
and in the case of first order approximation Ck is omitted as well, leaving only bk. This method is not limited to
MSE objectives and in the classification task we use a binary cross-entropy objective analogously in the output
layer.
Note that on the first W step, unperturbed 1st and 2nd-order approximations provide the same gradient. In this
case, if we use vanilla SGD to optimize this first order approximation, this boils down to a variant of DP-SGD,
which optimizes each layer objective function separately.
Analytic Sensitivities of the coefficients are given in the appendix. Depending on the architecture of a neural
network and dataset at hand, these analytic sensitivity bounds can often be loose, in which case we propose
to take a more direct approach and bound the sensitivities directly by clipping the norms of the coefficients
‖∂Tnk‖F ≤ Θ∂T and ‖∂2Tnk‖F ≤ Θ∂2T . Here, ∂Tnk denotes the matrix of ∂Tnkh vectors, which are used to
compute ∆bk and ∆Ck. We found that this yields significantly lower bounds in practice and use these clipping
thresholds, along with linear Taylor expansion for all experiments listed below.
2.3 Calculation of cumulative privacy loss
Using the moments accountant and the theorem for subsampled Gaussian mechanism given in [1] for composition
requires caution, since the log moments of privacy loss are linearly growing, only if we draw fresh noise per
new subsampled data. Up to this point our algorithm, unfortunately, draws many noises for many losses given a
subsampled data. This is fixed by treating the vectorized coefficients of the perturbed layerwise objectives as
a single vector quantity [a1,b1,C1, · · · , aK ,bK ,CK , ] which is perturbed in one step. As previously done
in [6], we scale down each objective function coefficient by its own sensitivity times the number of partitions√
MK, where m = 3 if ak,bk,Ck are used to compute the loss (and m = 1 if only bk is used). This sets the
concatenated vector’s sensitivity to 1. Then, we add the standard Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ to
the vectors and scale up each perturbed quantities by their own sensitivity times
√
MK. Partitioning the vector
in this way allows us to effectively consider the sensitivity and clipping bounds in each layer independently.
Details are given in appendix I. The DP-MAC algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 DP-MAC algorithm
Require: Dataset D, total number of iterations T , privacy parameter σ2, sampling rate q
Ensure: (ε, δ)-DP weights {Wk}K+1k=1
for number of Iterations ≤ T do
1. Optimize eq. 2 for Z
2. Optimize eq. 5 (noised-up objective) for W
end for
Calculate the total privacy loss (ε, δ) using moments accountant
3 Experiments
Autoencoder We examine the performance of DP-MAC, when training deeper models, in a reconstruction
task with a fully connected autoencoder with 6 layers, as used in the original MAC paper [3]. Unlike the original
paper, we don’t store any z values but initialized them with a forward pass on each iteration. For this, we use the
USPS dataset is a collection of 16x16 pixel grayscale handwritten digits, of which we use 5000 samples for
3
Figure 1: Autoencoder training and test errors. (± 1 stdev. of the latter) averaged over 10 runs each.
training and 5000 for testing. We provide results for ε values of 1, 2, 4, 8 with δ =1e-5. For comparison, we
train the same model with DP-SGD where we use a single norm bound Θg for the full step-wise gradient of the
model. In Fig 1, we observe that DP-MAC lacks behind DP-SGD in both private and non-private settings. We
suspect that this is in part owed to vanishing gradient updates in the MAC model. We found that independent of
the number of Z updates per iteration, gradient updates in the first and last layer of the model differ by up to 4
orders of magnitude. DP-SGD does not exhibit this problem.
Classifier In addition, we show the performance of our method compared to other existing methods on
a classification task on the MNIST digit dataset. We train a classifier with a single hidden layer of 300
units using DP-MAC with noise levels σ = [1.0, 2.8, 8.0], which guarantees DP with δ = 10−5 and ε =
[8, 2, 0.5]. As in [1], we use a DP-PCA to reduce input dimensionality to 60. Table 2 shows the comparison
between our method and the DP-SGD results by [1] as well as the DP convolutional deep belief networks
(DP-CDBN) by [10]. Here, our method achieves a comparable test accuracy under the same privacy constraint
within a relatively small number of training epochs. Our implementation of both experiments is available at
https://github.com/mijungi/dp_mac.
DP-SGD DP-CDBN DP-MAC
ε = 0.5 0.90 0.92 0.90
# epochs 16 162 10
ε = 2 0.95 0.95 0.95
# epochs 120 162 30
ε = 8 0.97 0.97
# epochs 700 30
Figure 2: Test performance of DP-MAC compared to [1] DP-SGD and DP-CDBN [10] at δ = 10−5
4 Conclusion
We present a novel differentially private deep learning paradigm, DP-MAC, which allows us to compute the
sensitivity of the approximate objective functions analytically. Empirically however, we find that directly setting
clipping bounds yields significantly lower sensitivities, which leads us to gradient perturbation as a special case.
We found that MAC in its current state exhibits vanishing gradient problems in scaling to deeper models, which
we believe causes the decrease in test performance compared to regular DP-SGD when training deeper models.
Nonetheless, we believe that this work offers an interesting new perspective on the possibilities computing
sensitivities in deep neural networks.
4
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Appendix A: Differential Privacy Background
Here we provide background information on the definition of algorithmic privacy and a composition method that
we will use in our algorithm, as well as the general formulation of the MAC algorithm.
Differential privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a formal definition of the privacy properties of data analysis algorithms [5]. Given
an algorithmM and neighbouring datasets D, D′ differing by a single entry. Here, we focus on the inclusion-
exclusion2 case, i.e., the dataset D′ is obtained by excluding one datapoint from the dataset D. The privacy
loss random variable of an outcome o is L(o) = log
Pr(M(D)=o)
Pr(M(D′)=o)
. The mechanismM is called ε-DP if and
only if |L(o)| ≤ ε, ∀o. A weaker version of the above is (ε, δ)-DP, if and only if |L(o)| ≤ ε, with probability at
least 1 − δ. What the definition states is that a single individual’s participation in the data do not change the
output probabilities by much, which limits the amount of information that the algorithm reveals about any one
individual.
The most common form of designing differentially private algorithms is by adding noise to a quantity of interest,
e.g., a deterministic function h : D 7→ Rp computed on sensitive data D. See [5] and [17] for more forms of
designing differentially-private algorithms. For privatizing h, one could use the Gaussian mechanism [16] which
adds noise to the function, where the noise is calibrated to h’s sensitivity, Sh, defined by the maximum difference
in terms of L2-norm, ‖h(D) − h(D′)‖2, h˜(D) = h(D) + N (0, S2hσ2Ip), where N (0, S2hσ2Ip) means the
Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and covariance S2hσ
2Ip. The perturbed function h˜(D) is (ε, δ)-DP, where
σ ≥√2 log(1.25/δ)/ε. In this paper, we use the Gaussian mechanism to achieve differentially private network
weights. Next, we describe how the cumulative privacy loss is calculated when we use the Gaussian mechanism
repeatedly during training.
The moments accountant
In the moments accountant, a cumulative privacy loss is calculated by bounding the moments of L(o), where
the λ-th moment is defined as the log of the moment generating function evaluated at λ [6]: αM(λ;D,D′) =
logEo∼M(D)
[
eλL
(o)
]
. By taking the maximum over the neighbouring datasets, we obtain the worst case λ-th
moment αM(λ) = maxD,D′ αM(λ;D,D′), where the form of αM(λ) is determined by the mechanism of
choice. The moments accountant compute αM(λ) at each step. Due to the composability theorem which states
that the λ-th moment composes linearly (See the composability theorem: Theorem 2.1 in [6] when independent
noise is added in each step, we can simply sum each upper bound on αMj to obtain an upper bound on the
total λ-th moment after T compositions, αM(λ) ≤∑Tj=1 αMj (λ). Once the moment bound is computed, we
can convert the λ-th moment to the (ε, δ)-DP, guarantee by, δ = minλ exp [αM(λ)− λε], for any ε > 0. See
Appendix A in [6] for the proof.
2This is for using the moments accountant method when calculating the cumulative privacy loss.
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Appendix B: Experiment Results
DP-SGD DP-CDBN DP-MAC
ε = 0.5 0.90 0.92 0.90
# epochs 16 162 10
ε = 2 0.95 0.95 0.95
# epochs 120 162 30
ε = 8 0.97 0.97
# epochs 700 30
(a) Test classification accuracy on MNIST
DP-SGD DP-MAC
ε = 1 11.8 12.7
ε = 2 9.6 10.9
ε = 4 7.9 9.6
ε = 8 6.4 8.4
ε =∞ 3.6 4.4
(b) Test reconstruction MSE on USPS
Table 1: Test performance of DP-MAC compared to [6] DP-SGD and DP-CDBN [11] at δ = 10−5
DP-MAC Classifier DP-MAC Autoencoder DP-SGD Autoencoder
layer-sizes 300 300-100-20-100-300-256 300-100-20-100-300-256
batch size 1000 500 (250 if ε ≤ 2) 500 (250 if ε ≤ 2)
train epochs 30 (10 if ε = 0.5) 50 100
optimizer Adam Adam SGD
W learning rate 0.01 (0.03 if ε = 0.5) 0.003 0.03
z learning rate 0.003 0.001
W lr-decay 0.95 (0.7 if ε = 0.5) 0.97 100 (50 if ε ≤ 2)
z-steps 30 30
W-steps 1 1
Θ∂T 0.3 0.001
Θg 0.01
σ values 1.0, 2.8, 8.0 1.8, 3.1, 4.1, 7.8 2.4, 4.3, 5.7, 11.0
σDP−PCA 4.0, 8.0, 16.0
Table 2: Training parameters choices for both DP-MAC experiments and the DP-SGD autoencoder
comparison
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Appendix C: Differences from the Previous Version
The previous version of this paper contained an error in the implementation which mistakenly lowered the
necessary amount of noise for a given privacy guarantee and, as a result reported wrong test results. In this
version we have corrected this error and made a number of additional changes which are listed below:
• Gradient update
– Fixed faulty gradient computation, which had reduced effective noise by up to 99% during
training.
– Improved clipping sensitivity by clipping ∂T rather than the norms of the coefficients bk,Ck.
– Reduced analytic sensitivity by 50% by excluding 1
2S
term from coefficients and making better
use of inclusion/exclusion DP.
• Experiments
– Removed histogram-based layer-wise clipping bound search, which had turned out to be costly
in terms of the privacy budget and yield relatively little improvement. Instead all layers now use
the same bound.
– Classifier experiment now uses DP-PCA to reduce input dimensionality as in [6]. overall results
stay roughly the same.
– Autoencoder: Worse results than DP-SGD, likely due to vanishing gradient issues.
– Replaced softplus activations with ReLUs.
– Significantly increased batch sizes.
• Notation
– Denoted Clipping thresholds as Θ to avoid confusion with Tnkh terms.
– Defined coefficients ak,bk,Ck excluding 12S term due to changes in sensitivity analysis.
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Appendix D: Additional Figures
Figure 3: Classifier training and test errors. (± 1 stdev. of the latter) averaged over 10 runs each.
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Figure 4: The input and output objective functions (black) are well approximated by the 2nd-order
approximations (red). In both cases, approximation is made at 0, where the true w at the input layer
is −0.7, and 0.7 at the output layer. The blue crosses depict additive noise centered around the
approximated loss and the noise variance is determined by the sensitivities of the coefficients and
privacy parameter σ2.
Figure 5: Learned significant features for labels 0,3,5,6,8 respectively. The non-private features show
higher contrast and more characteristics in the high frequencies, whereas the private features become
smoothed out and lose contrast.
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Algorithm 2 DP-MAC with learning Tbk
Require: D, T , σ2, σ2hist, q, initial threshold Tbk
Ensure: (ε, δ)-DP weights {Wk}K+1k=1
1. Pre-training using DP-MAC (Algo. 1)
2. DP-histogram release which determines Tbk
3. DP-MAC (Algo. 1) training using learned Tbk
Appendix E: sensitivity of ak
We are using a few assumptions and facts to derive sensitivities below.
• ‖zk,s‖2 ≤ Tz for a predefined threshold Tz for all k, s.
• Due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality: wTkhzk−1,s ≤ ‖wkh‖2Tz
• Using a monotonic nonlinearity (e.g., softplus): f(wTkhzk−1,S) ≤ f(‖wkh‖2Tz) and
f ′(wTkhzk−1,S) ≤ f ′(‖wkh‖2Tz)
• For softplus, 0 < f ′(wTkhzk−1,S) ≤ f ′(‖wkh‖2Tz) ≤ 1 and 0 < f
′′
(wTkhzk−1,s) ≤ 14
• ‖a‖2 ≤ ‖a‖1 ≤ ‖a‖2
√
D for a ∈ RD
• Direct application of above : |∑Dkouth=1 zkh,s| ≤∑Dkouth=1 |zkh,s| = ‖zk,s|>1| ≤ Tz√Dkout
Denote
αwˆkh := f(‖wˆkh‖2Tz)
βwˆkh := f
′(‖wˆkh‖2Tz)
which we will further denote as vectors αwˆk ,βwˆk .
Without loss of generality, we further assume that (1): the neighbouring datasets are in the form of D =
{D′, (xS ,yS)}.
∆ak = max|D\D′|=1
|ak(D)− ak(D′)|,
= max
|D\D′|=1
|
Dkout∑
h=1
{
S∑
s=1
(Tn(wˆkh)− wˆkh>∂Tskh + 12 wˆkh>∂2Tskhwˆkh)−
S−1∑
s=1
(Tn(wˆkh)− wˆkh>∂Tskh + 12 wˆkh>∂2Tskhwˆkh)}|
= max
|D\D′|=1
|
Dkout∑
h=1
(TS(wˆkh)− wˆkh>∂TSkh + 12 wˆkh>∂2TSkhwˆkh)|
Now the sensitivity can be divided into three terms due to triangle inequality as
∆ak ≤ max|D\D′|=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
TS(wˆkh)
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ak1
+ max
|D\D′|=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
wˆkh
>∂TSkh
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ak2
+ max
|D\D′|=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
1
2
wˆkh
>∂2TSkhwˆkh
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ak3
.
We compute the sensitivity of each of these terms below. The sensitivity of ak1 is given by
∆ak1 = max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
z2kh,S − 2zkh,Sf(wˆTkhzk−1,S) +
(
f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
z2kh,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
2zkh,Sf(wˆ
T
khzk−1,S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (T 2z + 2Tz‖αwˆk‖2 + ‖βwˆk‖22)
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The sensitivity of ak2 is given by
∆ak2 = max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
−2zkh,Sf ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) + 2f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
wˆTkhzk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
2zkh,Sf
′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
wˆTkhzk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
2f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
wˆTkhzk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
‖2zkh,Sf ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)wˆkh‖2 · ‖zk−1,S‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
‖2f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)wˆkh‖2 · ‖zk−1,S‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2Tz max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
|zkh,S | · ‖f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)wˆkh‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
‖f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)wˆkh‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ 2Tz
Tz ·
Dkout∑
h=1
β2wˆkh‖wkh‖22
1/2 + Dkout∑
h=1
|αwˆkhβwˆkh | · ‖wˆkh‖2
 ,
The sensitivity of ak3 is given by
∆ak3 = max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
−zkh,Sf ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) +
(
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
+ f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)(
wˆTkhzk−1,S
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
zkh,Sf
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)(
wˆTkhzk−1,S
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
((
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2)(
wˆTkhzk−1,S
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)(
wˆTkhzk−1,S
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
zkh,S · f ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) · ‖wˆkh‖22 · ‖zk−1,S‖22
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
(
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
· ‖wˆkh‖22 · ‖zk−1,S‖22
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dkout∑
h=1
f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) · ‖wˆkh‖22 · ‖zk−1,S‖22
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ T 2z max
zk,S
Dkout∑
h=1
1/4 · |zkh,S | · ‖wˆkh‖22 +
Dkout∑
h=1
(βwˆkh)
2 · ‖wˆkh‖22 +
Dkout∑
h=1
1/4αwˆkh · ‖wˆkh‖22

≤ T
2
z
4
Tz
Dkout∑
h=1
(‖wkh‖22)2
1/2 + Dkout∑
h=1
(
4 (βwˆkh)
2 + αwˆkh
) · ‖wˆkh‖22

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Appendix F: sensitivity of bk
∆bk = max|D\D′|=1
‖bk(D)− bk(D′)‖F = max|D\D′|=1
Dkout∑
h=1
‖bkh(D)− bkh(D′)‖22

1
2
,
≤ max
zk,Szk−1,S ,z′k,S ,z
′
k−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖(∂TS(wˆkh)− ∂2TS(wˆkh)wˆkh)‖22

1
2
≤ max
zk,Szk−1,S ,z′k,S ,z
′
k−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖∂TSkh‖22 +
Dkout∑
h=1
‖∂2TSkhwˆkh‖22

1
2
≤ (∆bk1 + ∆bk2)
1
2 ,
∆bk1 = max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖
(
−2zkh,Sf ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) + 2f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
zk−1,S‖22
≤ 2T 2z max
zk,Szk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
|(f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)− zkh,S)βwˆkh |2
≤ 2T 2z max
zk,Szk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
|αwˆkhβwˆkh − zkh,Sβwˆkh |2
≤ 2T 2z max
zk,Szk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
(
α2wˆkhβ
2
wˆkh + 2αwˆkhβ
2
wˆkh |zkh,S |+ z2kh,Sβ2wˆkh
)
≤ 2T 2z
||αwˆk  βwˆk ||22 + 2 min
Tz Dkout∑
h=1
αwˆkh , maxzk,Szk−1,S
max
i
(
αwˆkiβ
2
wˆki
)Dkout∑
h=1
zkh,S
+ T 2z
 , since z may be negative
≤ 2T 2z
||αwˆk  βwˆk ||22 + 2Tz min
Dkout∑
h=1
αwˆkh ,
√
Dkout max
i
(
αwˆkiβ
2
wˆki
)+ T 2z

12
∆bk2 = max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖
((
− 2zkh,Sf ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) + 2
(
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
+ 2f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
zk−1,Sz
T
k−1,S
)
wˆkh‖22
≤ 2 max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖zkh,Sf ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)zk−1,SzTk−1,Swˆkh‖22 + ‖
(
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
zk−1,Sz
T
k−1,Swˆkh‖22
+ ‖f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)zk−1,SzTk−1,Swˆkh‖22
≤ 2 max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖1/4 · zkh,Szk−1,SzTk−1,Swˆkh‖22
+ ‖
((
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
+ 1/4 · f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
zk−1,Sz
T
k−1,Swˆkh‖22
≤ 2 max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
|1/4 · zkh,S |2 · T 2z · T 2z ‖wˆkh‖22
+ ‖
((
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
+ 1/4 · f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
wˆkh‖22 · T 2z · T 2z
≤ T
4
z
8
T 2z ‖wk‖2F + Dkout∑
h=1
‖ (4β2wˆkh + αwˆkh) wˆkh‖22

Appendix G: sensitivity of Ck
The sensitivity of ∆Ck is given by
∆Ck = max|D\D′|=1
‖Ck(D)−Ck(D′)‖F ,
= max
|D\D′|=1
Dkout∑
h=1
‖Ckh(D)−Ckh(D′)‖2F

1
2
where
Ckh(D) =
S∑
s=1
1
2
∂2Tskh,
=
S∑
s=1
[
−2zkh,sf ′′(wˆkh>zk−1,s) + 2{f ′(wˆkh>zk−1,s)}2 + 2f(wˆkh>zk−1,s)f ′′(wˆkh>zk−1,s)
]
zk−1,szk−1,s
>.
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Due to the triangle inequality,
∆Ck ≤ max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖∆Ckh‖2F
1/2
= max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
‖
(
− 2zkh,Sf ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S) + 2
(
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
+ 2f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)
zk−1,Sz
T
k−1,S‖2F
1/2
≤ 2T 2z max
zk,S ,zk−1,S
Dkout∑
h=1
|zkh,Sf ′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)|2 + |
(
f ′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)
)2
+ f(wˆTkhzk−1,S)f
′′(wˆTkhzk−1,S)|2
1/2
≤ T
2
z
2
(
T 2z + ‖4 (βwˆk )2 +αwˆk‖22
)1/2
Appendix H: sensitivity of coefficients in the output layer objective function
∆ao ≤ 1
2S
max
zK,S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Doout∑
h=1
f(wˆTK+1hzK,S)−wTK+1hf ′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,S + 1/2wTK+1hf ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,SzTK,SwK+1h
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2S
max
zK,S
Doout∑
h=1
∣∣∣f(wˆTK+1hzK,S)∣∣∣+ Doout∑
h=1
∣∣∣wTK+1hf ′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,S∣∣∣+ Doout∑
h=1
∣∣∣1/2wTK+1hf ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,SzTK,SwK+1h∣∣∣
≤ 1
2S
‖αwK+1‖1 + Tz D
o
out∑
h=1
‖wK+1h · βwK+1h‖2 +
T 2z
8
‖wK+1‖2F

∆bo ≤ 1
2S
max
y,zK,S
Doout∑
h=1
‖ − yhzK,S + f ′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,S − f ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,SzTK,SwK+1h‖22
1/2
≤ 1
2S
max
y,zK,S
Doout∑
h=1
|(f ′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)− yh)− f ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zTK,SwK+1h|2‖zK,S‖22
1/2
≤ Tz
2S
max
y,zK,S
(Doout∑
h=1
(f ′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)− yh)2 + 2|(f ′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)− yh)f ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zTK,SwK+1h|
+ (f ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)z
T
K,SwK+1h)
2
)1/2
≤ Tz
2S
Doout + 2Tz Doout∑
h=1
[βwK+1h‖wK+1h‖2] + 1/16 · T 2z · ‖WK+1‖2F
1/2
∆Co ≤ 1
2S
max
zK,S
Doout∑
h=1
‖1/2f ′′(wˆTK+1hzK,S)zK,SzTK,S‖2F
1/2
≤ 1
2S
max
zK,S
Doout∑
h=1
‖1/8zK,SzTK,S‖2F
1/2
≤ 1
16S
√
DooutT
2
z
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Appendix I: Computing a cumulative privacy loss
Preliminary
We first address how the level of perturbation in the coefficients affects the level of privacy in the resulting
estimate. Suppose we have an objective function that’s quadratic in w, i.e.,
E(w) = a+ bw + cw2,
where only the coefficients a, b, c contain the information on the data (not anything else in the objective function
is relevant to data). We perturb the coefficients to ensure the coefficients are collectively (, δ)-differentially
private.
a˜ = a+ na, where na ∼ N (0,∆2aσ2),
b˜ = b+ nb, where nb ∼ N (0,∆2bσ2),
c˜ = c+ nc, where nc ∼ N (0,∆2cσ2),
where ∆a,∆b,∆c are the sensitivities of each term, and σ is a function of  and δ. Here “collectively" means
composing the perturbed a˜, b˜, c˜ results in (, δ)-DP. For instance, if one uses the linear composition method
(privacy degrades with the number of compositions), and perturbs each of these with a, b, and c, then the total
privacy loss should match the sum of these losses, i.e.,  = a + b + c. In this case, if one allocates the same
privacy budget to perturb each of these coefficients, then a = b = c = /3. The same holds for δ.
However, if one uses more advanced composition methods and allocates the same privacy budget for each
perturbation, per-perturbation budget becomes some function (denoted by g) of total privacy budget , i.e.,
a = b = c = g(), where g() ≥ /3. So, per-perturbation for a, b, c has a higher privacy budget to spend,
resulting in adding less amount of noise.
Whatever composition methods one uses to allocate the privacy budget in each perturbation of those coefficients,
since the objective function is a simple quadratic form in w, the resulting estimate of w is some function of those
perturbed coefficients, i.e., wˆ = h(a˜, b˜, c˜). Since the data are summarized in the coefficients and the coefficients
are (, δ)-differentially private, the function of these coefficients is also (, δ)-differentially private.
One could write the perturbed objective as
E˜(w) = a˜+ b˜w + c˜w2,
= (a+ bw + cw2) + (na + nbw + ncw
2),
= E(w) + n(w).
Note that we write down the noise term as n(w) to emphasize that when we optimize this objective function, the
noise term also contributes to the gradient with respect to w (not just the term E(w)).
If we denote some standard normal noise α ∼ N (0, 1), we can rewrite the noise term as
n(w) = (∆a + ∆bw + ∆cw
2)σα,
which is equivalent to
n(w) ∼ N (0, (∆a + ∆bw + ∆cw2)2σ2),
∼ N (0,∆2E(w)σ2)
where we denote ∆E(w) = ∆a + ∆bw + ∆cw2.
Extending the preliminary to DP-MAC
In the framework of DP-MAC, given a mini-batch of data Dq with a sampling rate q, the DP-mechanism we
introduce first computes coefficients for layer-wise objective functions (K layer-wise objective functions for
a model with K layers, including the output layer), then noise up the coefficients using Gaussian noise, and
outputs the vector of perturbed coefficients for each layer, given by:
Mk(Dq) =
akbk
Ck
+
 n
∗
a,k(Wk,∆ak )
n∗b,k(Wk,∆bk )
n∗C,k(Wk,∆Ck )
 .
We denote the noise terms by n∗(W,∆) and the sensitivities of each coefficient by ∆ak , · · · ,∆Ck .
Here the question is, if we decide to use an advanced composition method such as moments accountant, how the
log-moment of the privacy loss random variable composes in this case. To directly use the composition theorem
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of Abadi et al, we need to draw a fresh noise whenever we have a new subsampled data. This means, there
should be an instance of Gaussian mechanism that affects the these noise terms simultaneously.
To achieve this, we rewrite the vector of perturbed objective coefficients as E˜(w) below. For each layer we gather
the loss coefficients into one vector [ak, vec(bk), vec(Ck)]T . Then, we scale down each objective function by
its own sensitivity times the number of partitions
√
MK, so that the concatenated vector’s sensitivity becomes
just 1. Then, add the standard normal noise to the vectors with scaled standard deviation, σ. Then, scale up each
perturbed quantities by its own sensitivity times
√
MK. In this example we use all three coefficients, so M = 3.
Note that in the experiments, using linear expansion we would only use bk and so M would equal 1 in that case.
In the following we use Pm,k to denote the a partition of the vector, which may pick out any of the contained
coefficients, e.g. ak,bk or Ck for m = 1,m = 2 and m = 3 respectively.
M(Dq) =

P˜1,1(W1)
...
P˜M,1(W1)
...
P˜M,K(WK)

=

P1,1(W1)
...
PM,K(WK)
+

n∗1(W1)
...
n∗M,K(WK)

=

√
MK∆P1,1(W1) ·
{
P1,1(W1)√
MK∆P1,1(W1)
+ σN (0, 1)
}
. . .
√
MK∆PM,K(WK) ·
{
PM,K(WK)√
MK∆PM,K (WK )
+ σN (0, 1)
}

=

√
MK∆P1,1(W1)
. . .√
MK∆PM,K(WK)
 ·


P1,1(W1)√
K∆P1,1(W1)
. . .
PM,K(WK)√
K∆PM,K (WK )
+N (0, σ2I)

Since we’re adding independent Gaussian noise under each subsampled data, the privacy loss after T steps, is
simply following the composibility theorem in the Abadi et al paper.
So compared to the sensitivity for n(w) in the first section, the new noise n∗(w) has a higher sensitivity due to
the factor
√
MK.
Moments Calculations
In this case, with a subsampling with rate q, we re-do the calculations in Abadi et al. First, let:
µ0 = N (0K , σ2I), µ1 = N (1K , σ2I)
and let µ as a mixture of the two Gaussians,
µ = (1− q)N (0K , σ2I) + qN (1K , σ2I).
Here 0K is the K-dimensional 0 vector, and 1K is the K-dimensional all ones vector. Here αM (λ) should be
log max(E1, E2) where
E1 = Ez∼µ[(µ(z)/µ0(z))λ], E2 = Ez∼µ0 [(µ0(z)/µ(z))
λ]
Then, we can compose further mechanisms using this particular αM (λ), which follows the same analysis as in
Abadi et al.
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